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Ideas from 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding' by David Hume [1748], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Enquiries Conc. Human Understanding, Morals' by Hume,David (ed/tr Selby-Bigge/Nidditch) [OUP 1975,0-19-824536-x]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
2196 The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
2187 If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
2200 All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
4636 All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
2197 Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
7700 We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
13602 We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
2216 We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
2215 There is no such thing as chance
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
2209 Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
2208 Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects
2207 Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
3661 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Strawson,G]
2213 Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
2191 Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
2239 If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
2237 It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
23631 Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid]
2192 All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses
2246 If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames
2190 All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact
2182 Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones
2184 All ideas are copies of impressions
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
2189 All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
2702 Only madmen dispute the authority of experience
2183 We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences
2217 When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise
2205 You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience
2186 We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced
2194 How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire?
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
3902 Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton]
23421 If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
2206 Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2235 There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
10328 We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection
2230 Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
2238 Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects
2242 Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
2243 Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
2236 Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2240 It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument
2241 The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
2198 We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
2202 Fools, children and animals all learn from experience
2204 All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning
2199 Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places
2201 Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this
2203 If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
6350 Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz]
3598 Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
2210 A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance
17712 General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular
8544 Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
2211 When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
2214 Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning
2212 An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2222 The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
2223 Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains
3655 Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
2220 Only experience teaches us about our wills
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2224 Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
2225 If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime
2226 Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
2233 No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
2195 We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
2245 A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect
4772 If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
8341 Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Strawson,G]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8344 At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
2234 It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other
3662 Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Strawson,G]
4771 In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos]
5194 Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer]
2221 A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience
2193 No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8422 Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
2218 In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities
15249 Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden]
8339 Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Strawson,G]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
2244 It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
2232 You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
2229 To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event
2227 A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored
2228 All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle'
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
2185 The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds